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When can a tenancy be terminated under s 129 of the 
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld)? –  
WD Duncan1 
          This article reviews the nature and purpose of s 129 of the Property Law Act 1974 
(Qld) whose application has given rise to some confusion in the past, particularly where the 
lessee against whom it is being used is also is breach of the lease at the time of receiving the 
notice.   The article explores the historical origins of the section, firstly  in New South Wales 
where it was enacted in 1930, and attempts to outline modern circumstances where it may 
be applied or particularly applied in Queensland. 
Introduction into Queensland 
The enactment of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) on 1 December 1975 brought with it the 
introduction of s129.  Since its enactment there has been a poor understanding of the 
application of the section and much confusion of the distinction between a statutory “tenancy 
at will” whose termination is governed by s 129 which requires one month’s notice for 
termination and tenancies at will which arise by operation of law and whose termination is 
governed by s 137 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) which requires “reasonable notice” 
for termination.  The application of s129 is further complicated by the limited circumstances 
in which it might enliven.  These circumstances are those where an implied year to year 
tenancy might arise by operation of law when a lessee enters possession “with no agreement 
(at law) as to its duration”. This concept arose initially where a purported lease for a duration 
failed to meet formal requirements of a lease under the Statute of Frauds but in modern times, 
the breadth of application has widened to include occasions where a purported lease is not 
registered or where the lease otherwise fails to meet a statutory requirement both of which 
may be essential to give the lessee the benefit of the term.  This article examines the history 
of the section through its progenitor in s 127 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (New South 
Wales) and the contemporary circumstances in which it is applied. The section is set out 
below in full. 
Abolition of yearly tenancies arising by implication of law 
 
(1) No tenancy from year to year shall, after the commencement of this Act, be implied by 
payment of rent; if there is a tenancy, and no agreement as to its duration, then such tenancy 
shall be deemed to be a tenancy determinable at the will of either of the parties by 1 month’s 
notice in writing expiring at any time. 
 
(2) This section shall not apply where there is a tenancy from year to year which has arisen by 
implication before the commencement of this Act, and, in the case of any such tenancy in 
respect of which the date of its creation is unknown to the lessor or lessee, as the case may be, 
                                                            
1 Professor, Queensland University of Technology, Co Director Commercial and Property Law Centre, Faculty of 
Law; the author is indebted to the helpful comments upon drafts of this article by his colleague Associate 
Professor Bill Dixon but takes full responsibility for what appears here. 
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who is seeking to determine the same, such tenancy shall, subject to any express agreement to 
the contrary, be determinable by 6 months’ notice in writing expiring on the day immediately 
before the first anniversary of the coming into operation of this Act, or any date afterwards. 
 
Historical origins 
 
From the enactment of the Statute of Frauds in 16772 in England leases not in writing and 
signed by the parties were to take effect as leases at will only with the exception of leases not 
exceeding a period of three years and at rack (market) rent.  However, there were occasions 
where parties had agreed to a lease for a term but had failed to comply with the formalities of 
writing before the lessee entered possession and commenced paying rent.  Strictly, these non- 
compliant leases would have rendered the tenancy of no effect.  However, the common law 
courts subverted the operation of the Statute of Frauds by implying a tenancy from year to 
year upon receiving evidence that the parties had agreed upon a lease for a fixed term and 
that the lessee had entered into possession and paid rent pursuant to that antecedent 
agreement which remained informal.  Strictly, upon entry into possession before the payment 
and acceptance of rent, the tenancy was a tenancy at will only.  However, upon the payment 
and acceptance of rent the tenancy ceased being a tenancy at will and became an implied 
tenancy from year to year determinable upon six months’ notice expiring at the end of any six 
month period.3  Notice could be given by either party. 
 
It was thought that a tenancy from year to year could not arise in any circumstances unless 
the rent was paid yearly or by reference to a year or an aliquot part of a year, that is, monthly, 
quarterly or six monthly.  If a lessee entered possession and paid rent in any other manner, 
without any antecedent agreement upon a fixed term, the tenancy would remain a tenancy at 
will for a period as long as either of the parties wished it to continue.4 
 
In fact, s 12(1) of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) recognises the effect of informality in the 
creation of leases when it states that “all interest in land created by parol and not put in 
writing and signed by the person creating them shall have, despite any consideration having 
been given for the same, the force and effect of interests at will only”.  At common law, a 
tenancy at will terminated when either party performed an act which was inconsistent with 
the parties’ will that the tenancy should continue.  However, this has now been converted by 
virtue of section 137 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) into either party giving reasonable 
notice to the other to terminate a tenancy at will.  What is reasonable depends upon the nature 
and duration of the tenancy.5  The exception to this is contained in s 12(2) which exempts 
leases for a period not exceeding three years taking effect in possession.  This section 
validates leases up to a fixed term of three years which do not comply with the Statute of 
                                                            
2 29 Car 11 c3 s1 
3 This historical conspectus is taken from the erudite judgment of Jordan CJ in Dockrill v Cavanagh (1944) 45 SR 
(NSW) 788 at 80 ‐82 in reference to s 127 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) which is in identical terms to s 
129 . 
4 Moore v Diamond (1929) 43 CLR 105 at 114‐ 117 per Knox CJ, Rich and Dixon JJ 
5 Landale v Menzies (1909) 9 CLR 89 
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Frauds requirements or the requirements of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) which protects a 
“short lease.”6 
 
It would logically follow from this that one form of lease to which s 129 might have 
application would be leases which were not validated by the equivalent of s 12 of the 
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) being leases where the term agreed was in excess of three years 
and, further, not registered under the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld).  The key element of  such a 
lease is that there exists an antecedent agreement to which effect is not given either by a 
failure of formalities or from some other cause. 
 
The nature of a tenancy subject to s 129 
 
The section applies to tenancies “with no agreement as to its duration”.  This is a critical 
phrase in the interpretation of the section.  The phrase has been held to mean no agreement 
between the parties “operative at common law to incorporate as part of it a provision that it 
was to continue for a term of years or be at will or a periodic tenancy.”7  As an implied 
tenancy from year to year, the terms of the lease would be those agreed except as far as they 
were inconsistent with a yearly tenancy.8  An implied yearly tenancy was only terminable on 
six months notice expiring at the end of any six month period.  Given the types of leases to 
which s 129 now applies, a notice period of this length is impractical.  Agricultural tenancies 
were often year to year tenancies with the rent being paid yearly giving the lessee an 
opportunity to enjoy the term for a full yearly planting and harvest period.  Year to year 
tenancies now are almost unknown, even as agreed periodic tenancies.  
Terms in an agreement for lease which might be inconsistent with an implied tenancy from 
year to year would include, for example, a break clause permitting termination on three 
months notice or a default clause stating that if rent remained unpaid for 14 days, the lessor 
could re-enter 9  Another example has been where the agreement for lease permits the lessor 
the option of converting the lease upon the lessee’s default into a weekly tenancy which 
would be incompatible with an implied yearly tenancy and thus unenforceable.10  
 Despite the fact that the informal lease did not secure the tenure at law for the period agreed, 
the contract embodied in the original informal agreement remained enforceable in all other 
respects and any claim of the lessor for breach of the terms would sound in damages.11  The 
lessor could sue for loss of the lease based upon the full period of the informal agreement.12 
Further, as between the original parties to the lease, if the informal agreement for lease 
remained specifically enforceable, equity would grant a decree which would have the effect 
of directing compliance (by the lessor generally) with the formalities and the lease would be 
                                                            
6 Defined in Schedule 2 as being  “(a) a lease for a term not exceeding 3 years or (b) a lease from year to year 
or shorter period”; A “short lease” is an exception to indefeasibility ,Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 185(2)(b). 
7 Dockrill v Cavanagh (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 78 at 83 per Jordan CJ 
8 Chan v Cresdon (1989)168 CLR 242 at 268 
9 Bigazzi v Brandigo Pty Ltd (1981) 2 BPR 9341 at 9351. 
10 Kemp v Lumeah Investments Pty Ltd (1983) BPR 9203 
11 Leitz  Leeholme Stud Pty Ltd v Robinson [1977] 2 NSWLR 544 at 547 
12 Telado Pty Ltd v Vincent (1996) 7 BPR 14,874 at 14,881 per Powell J. 
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treated as a legal lease for the period for the term.  It created “an equitable term of years and a 
tenure by estoppel” between the lessor and the lessee.13  Mason J (as he then was) in 
Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd14 preferred the explanation that this was 
the application of the principle of equity that equity deems that as done which ought to be 
done rather than any reliance upon the doctrine of estoppel.  The precondition to 
enforceability would require the agreement for lease to be for valuable consideration and to 
meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, ie writing and signature.15 
If a lessor sought to terminate a specifically enforceable agreement for lease in the meantime, 
that is, by giving notice under s 129, the court would restrain the lessor by injunction from 
doing so pending the enforcement of the right of the lessee to insist upon the execution of a 
formal, and, in practice, a lease in registrable form and force the lessor by order to cooperate 
to have it registered.16  This could not occur if the agreement for lease had been terminated 
for breach by the lessee at the time the lessee sought the decree.17 
As a result of Walsh v Lonsdale,18 after the Judicature Acts 1873 (Eng),the jurisdictions of 
law and equity were merged and there was no need for a party to actually seek a decree of 
specific performance.  Instead, the court would act upon evidence that the circumstances 
were such that a decree of specific performance would be ordered and thus declare the status 
of the parties upon that basis.19  Equity would treat the lease as a legal lease as between the 
original parties and legal remedies, such as claims for rent and damages for breach of the 
lease would be available. 
Given these parameters, it is now appropriate to compare a lease “with no agreement as to its 
duration” and other forms of tenancy with which it is often confused. 
 
Difference between an express periodic tenancy and a tenancy without agreement as to 
its duration 
 
There is often confusion between the nature of a true periodic tenancy and a tenancy to which 
s 129 applies.  It is clear that s 129 cannot apply in circumstances where an implied  tenancy 
from year to year would not have arisen at law20 and it is necessary to firstly identify the 
nature of the tenancy under consideration before turning to the application of the section.  
One must look at the circumstances at the time of commencement of the tenancy or the 
authority given by the lessor which permitted the lessee to take possession.  If there was an 
agreement between the parties at the time of possession that the holding should be a periodic 
                                                            
13 National Trustees, Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd v Boyd (1926) 39 CLR 72 at 82 per Knox CJ 
,Gavan Duffy and Rich J. 
14 (1985) 157 CLR 17 at 27 
15 Property Law Act 1974, ss10(1) ,11(1);Hoyts Pty Ltd v Spencer (1919) 27 CLR 133 at 142‐143. 
16 Dockrill v Cavanagh (1944) 45 SR (NSW)( 78 at 83 per Jordan CJ 
17 Dimond v Moore (1931) 45  CLR 159. 
18 1882) 21 ChD 9 
19 For the application of this principle in Queensland ,see Ahern v Wilkinson [1929] St R Qd 66 
20 Burnham v Carroll Musgrove Theatres  Ltd  & Victoria Arcade (1928) 28 SR (NSW) 160 at 170‐171  
      per Ferguson J (with whom Harvey CJ in Eq and Campbell J agreed)(approved Burnham v Carroll Musgrove   
Theatres Ltd (1928) 41 CLR 540 at  548 per Knox CJ ,Gavan Duffy and Powers JJ) 
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tenancy, regardless of the period chosen, then the tenancy would be  an express periodic 
tenancy and no implication of any type of tenancy can arise.21 
In this instance, the tenancy must be determined according to its classification as a weekly, 
monthly or yearly tenancy in accordance with the notice requirements of the Property Law 
Act 1974 (Qld).22  Thus, an express yearly tenancy cannot be terminated under s 129. 
 
 
Difference between a tenancy at will and a tenancy without agreement as to its duration 
 
A tenancy at will arises at common law when a person enters a property with the owner’s 
consent and commences paying rent upon the basis that either party can terminate the tenancy 
at any time without notice to quit.  A tenancy at will may be either implied or can be created 
by express agreement. A common law tenancy at will can be determined at any time by either 
party where either party acts inconsistently with the existence of the tenancy.23  At common 
law its creation is consistent with those situations which give rise to a common law tenancy 
“with no agreement as to its duration at law”.  However, in the latter case, upon the payment 
and acceptance of rent, the tenancy at will could become an implied year to year tenancy. 
 
This would occur where there existed an antecedent agreement for a lease for a term in some 
form.  Examples would include where a lessee enters under a void or unenforceable lease24, 
holds over after the expiry of the lease, where a prospective lessee goes into possession 
during negotiations and the formal lease is never finalised or where a purchaser under a 
contract of sale enters possession of the subject property pending completion of the sale.In 
modern times, except for a tenancy at will created expressly by agreement, it has been 
observed that  the only purpose of such a tenancy is to protect the interest of a tenant during a 
period of transition from one status to another.  The protection afforded is the protection of a 
lessee with exclusive possession for an indefinite period pending the resolution of the matter, 
that is, formalisation of the lease, which enabled the lessee to take possession.25 
If rent is paid by a lessee  on a periodic basis referable to a yearly tenancy, then it is likely a  
tenancy would arise based upon the period of rental payment and the qualification that it is 
for an “aliquot” part of a year, that is monthly ,quarterly or half yearly.  Early cases on the 
New South Wales equivalent of s 129 held that such circumstances created a tenancy at will 
which “was assimilated” into a tenancy (at common law) with no agreement as to its 
duration26.  The confusion between tenancies at will properly so called and tenancies the 
subject of s 129 was adverted to by the High Court in Kater v Kater27 referring to a number 
of earlier New South Wales authorities on the New South Wales’ equivalent of s 129.28 
                                                            
21  Brisbane City Council v The Council Club Inc.,(unreported),Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal,No 
4 of 1995,9 May 1995, Davies,McPherson JJA and Byrne J 
22  Property Law Act 1974, s 133 (weekly),s 134 (monthly),s 135,(yearly),s 136(other). 
23  Wheeler v Mercer [1957] AC 416 at 427 per Lord Simonds 
24  Where the provisions of the Statute of Frauds were not complied with ,for example, writing or signature. 
25  Heslop v Burns [1974] 1 WLR 1241 at 1253 per Scarman LJ (as he then was) 
26  O’Dea v Bougin (1950) 51 SR (NSW) 154 at 157 
27  (1960)104 CLR 497 at 506 
28   Larke Hoskins  & Co Ltd v Icher (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 142;Hardy v Battaglene (1945) 46  SR (NSW) 134; 
6 
 
. 
The lessee holding under a lease subject to s 129 is limited in actions.  For example, the 
ability of a lessee holding under a lease subject to termination under s 129 to give a sublease 
is questionable given the fact that the head lease might be determined on one month’s notice 
expiring at any time29.   
The failure to properly identify the difference between these two types of tenancies can later 
lead to the wrong period of notice being given to determine the lessee’s interest but it might 
aslo misconstrue the powers of the lessee in other transactions. 
 
The inaction between  s 124 and  129 of the Property Law Act 1974 
 
It might be thought that such an informal lease could be terminated for breach by the lessee 
without being formalised.  This is an instance where the lessee could not seek specific 
performance being in breach of their own obligations.  However, the proper method of 
termination for breach by forfeiture, if there is a covenant permitting re-entry upon breach, is 
to serve a Notice to Remedy Breach under s 124 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) which 
would avail the lessee a reasonable time to remedy the breach before possible forfeiture and 
the right to relief against forfeiture should the breach be remediable.30  It is not possible for 
the lessor to merely serve a notice to terminate the lease under s 129 although the reverse 
might apply where lessor is in breach of the lease permitting the lessee to serve a notice under 
s 129 as the right to relief against forfeiture is not involved.  Conversely, where the lessor is 
in substantial breach of the agreement for lease, the lessee could accept the conduct of the 
lessor as a repudiation of the underlying agreement for lease, and terminate the agreement 
immediately31.  Termination under s 129 would not destroy either parties’ right to claim 
damages for breach of the lease to that time or for damages for loss of the lease where it had 
been repudiated as the contract embodied in the lease operates separately from the leasehold 
estate. 
 
Contemporary instances where the right to termination  under s 129 has 
arisen 
 
(1) Where a party enters into possession under a void or unenforceable lease 
 
Where a lessee enters possession of premises under a lease which is subsequently declared to 
be void or unenforceable, the lease is unable to create the right of possession for the term and 
the issue becomes one upon which basis the lessee is holding.  Upon the answer to this 
question depends the type of notice to be given to terminate that right.  For example, a lessor 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
      Gordon v Wilkinson (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 266. 
29   Coumbis v Metropolitan Trade Finance Co Pty Ltd [1972] 1 NSWLR 1 at 4 per Sugerman ACJ 
30 Aquamere  Pty Ltd v Exelman Pty Ltd (1988)  Q Conv R 54‐304 at 58,211; section 123 of the Property Law Act 
1974 defines “lease” as including “agreement for lease under which the lessee is entitled to have a lease 
granted” 
31   Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali (1985) 157 CLR 17 at 36‐37 (although a Notice to Remedy Breach 
had been served in that case) 
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has been able to give notice under s 129 in circumstances where a lease was entered into 
subject to the consent of a Minister as required by the Land Act 1994 (Qld) and the lessee has 
entered possession and paid rent upon the terms of the agreement before consent had been 
granted or after consent has been refused. 
In Palmdale Insurance Ltd v Sprenger,32 a perpetual town lease had been entered into by the 
parties with the formalities compliant but without ministerial approval as required by the 
Land Act 1962 (Qld).  As such the concluded agreement was defeasible upon refusal of 
consent.  Connolly J (with whom de Jersey JJ agreed) found that specific performance of the 
agreement for lease would not have been ordered given the lack of Ministerial consent and 
the fact that the lessees were in arrears of rent.33  His Honour held that there “was no 
operative agreement for a term” and that s 129 applied.  The same conclusion was reached in 
similar circumstances by Atkinson J in Mooloolaba Slipways Pty Ltd v Cashlaw Pty Ltd.34   
In both instances, the inference is that Ministerial consent would have permitted creation of 
the term at law   
 
(2) Where a lessee remains in possession after termination of an existing 
lease without an express holding over provision 
 
Where after the expiry of a lease a lessee holds over, there being no express clause dealing 
with this situation, and the facts do not exclude an agreement to hold upon the terms of the 
old lease,35 then the old terms remain to the extent they might apply to a tenancy at will.  
Upon the payment of rent, the tenancy at will is converted into an implied tenancy from year 
to year.36  That being so, the provisions of s 129 apply to it reducing the period of notice to 
quit from six months to one month expiring at any time.  Where a lease term expires and 
there is an express holding over provision converting the holding into a periodic tenancy,the 
law relating to that particular periodic tenancy would apply to the continuing right to occupy 
and notice to quit would be given accordingly.  In commercial leases, a month to month 
tenancy is often created where the lessee remains in possession and pays rent after the expiry 
of the term 
In Dockrill v Cavanagh,37 a lessee under a four year lease, which was registered, exercised an 
option for another two years.  No formal lease was ever entered into after the exercise of the 
option and the lessee remained in possession paying rent even after the renewed term had 
expired.  There was no provision in the lease (or the renewed lease) for a holding over. 
Jordan CJ held that the New South Wales equivalent of s 129 applied to the lease during the 
period  after the two year renewed period had expired by effluxion of time. 
 
(3) Where a lessee is in possession under an unregistered lease exceeding three years 
 
                                                            
32 [1988] 1 Qd R 414 (FC) 
33 Ibid. at 417 
34 [2011] QSC 236 at [79]‐[80] 
35 Cole v Kelly [1920] 2 KB 106 at 132 per Atkin LJ (as he then was) 
36  Burnham v Carroll Musgrove Theatres Ltd (1928)  41 CLR 540 at 565 per Higgins J 
37 (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 78 
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Section 71 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld)expressly provides that “an unregistered lease of a 
lot is not invalid merely because it is unregistered.  Such an unregistered lease, particularly 
where its term exceeds three years is a source of equitable rights and like a legal lease defines 
the relationship of any common law tenancy that existed up until the time of registration38.  
At first glance, s 129 would apply to such a tenancy.  The failure to register a lease exceeding 
three years would not secure the right to the term at law as an interest under the Land Title 
Act 1994 (Qld) only passes upon registration of an instrument in proper form.39  The implied 
common law tenancy from year to year so created would be terminable by notice under s 
12940 but subject to the right of the lessee to enforce the lease should the lessor seek to 
terminate it in the absence of breach by the lessee.  Thus, if the lease was specifically 
enforceable by the lessee, the lessor could not give notice under s 129 and would be 
restrained from doing so by injunction pending the lessee taking action against the lessor to 
have the lease registered.  However, if the lessee could not secure specific performance, the 
lessor might be able to give notice under s 129 to terminate the statutory tenancy created41 but 
this may be subject to the lessee’s right to seek relief against the potential forfeiture 
considered above.  There is one exception to this.  Certainly, a purchaser who became 
registered without agreeing to be personally bound by the informal lease42 could give a notice 
under s 129 as the legal interest of the purchaser would immediately upon the purchaser’s 
registration as owner override the lessee’s equitable interest under the lease.43  Also, the 
agreement for lease would not be enforceable by the lessee against a purchaser as there would 
be no privity of contract.  It is arguable that at such time the equitable lessee would have no 
interest at all and would be a trespasser and liable to immediate ejectment, any rent received 
being treated as mesne profits or damages for trespass although the matter has never been 
decided. 
(4) Where a lessee enters possession during negotiations for lease and the 
lessee commences rental payment but negotiations are never concluded. 
It is sometimes the case that a lessee is permitted entry into premises during negotiations, 
commences paying rent on some basis ,and negotiations are never concluded.  Such an issue 
arose in Brisbane City Council v The Council Club Inc.44.  Here, a lessee was permitted to 
enter possession of premises during negotiations for the lease of a club some consensus being 
that the rental was to be paid at the rate of $100 per year plus a share of the club’s profits.  
The club remained in occupation for over 18 years paying only $100 per year and no 
percentage of the share of the club’s profits to be paid as rent was ever agreed and a formal 
lease was never prepared or executed.  After 18 years of tenancy, the lessor gave a notice 
under s 129 to vacate the premises by a certain time after which it was intended by the lessor 
that a new tenancy would commence where the rental payment was to be $29,133 per month.  
The club claimed that it had a year to year tenancy and thus required at least six month’s 
                                                            
38 Ashton v Hunt [1999] 1 Qd R 571 at 574 per Thomas JA (with whom Cullinane J agreed) 
39 Section 181 
40 Chan v Cresdon Pty Ltd (1989) 168 CLR 242 at 249 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and McHugh JJ. 
41 Carberry v Gardiner (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 559 at 570; Twidale v Bradley [1990] 2 Qd R 464 at 476 per Cooper J 
42 Valbirn Pty Ltd v Powprop Pty Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 295 (FC) 
43 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 184 (1)  
44 Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal, No 4 of 1995,9 May 1995, Davies,McPherson JJA and Byrne J 
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notice to quit.  The Court found otherwise that this was an implied tenancy from year to year 
and one “with no agreement to its duration at law”, not an express periodic tenancy, and thus 
notice under s 129 was held to be properly given. 
Conclusions 
The cases that illustrate the application of s129 and its equivalent provision in New South 
Wales demonstrate that its application is the subject of some confusion and that parties before 
the court have, in the first instance, been in dispute as to whether on the facts before the 
court, the lease so called can be properly characterised as one where “there is no agreement 
as to its duration at law.”  The application of the section would appear to be restricted to 
those cases where a lessee has gone into possession before leasing formalities have been 
completed either as far as the agreement is concerned or through registration where that is 
required to create a legal lease in the jurisdiction.  It also may occur in rare cases, where a 
lessee is in possession contrary to some statutory provision making the lease void. 
Practitioners dealing with leasehold interests should be alive to these anomalies.  To properly 
identify the nature of the lessee’s holding it is critical to trace back the origin of the lessee’s 
right to possession in the first instance and then trace the history of the dealings since the 
lessee took possession up until the time of any dispute.  In most cases in which s 129 can be 
invoked, there is an informal lease somewhere in the background 
 
Questions to be considered by practitioners dealing with this situation might be: 
1. Is there in existence an agreement for lease? 
2. Is it a lease for a period exceeding three years or a term created by the exercise of an 
option? 
3. Did the lessee take possession in the first instance under this lease and have the 
impression that this lease was valid and enforceable? 
4. Is there some factor which denies that agreement full efficacy through informality or 
lack of registration or something else, for instance, Ministerial consent. 
5. Can the lessee force the lessor to comply with the formalities? 
6. Are any parties in breach of the lease? 
7. Has the freehold to which the lease is subject been transferred since the 
commencement of the lease? 
 
If questions 1-4 are answered positively, then it is possible that there exists an agreement 
for lease with no agreement as to its duration at law and that s 129 applies to the lease.  
Questions 5-7 should also be considered before action is taken under s 129. 
